Introduction
Search theory is the discipline that treats the problem of how best to search for an object when the amount of searching efforts is limited and only probabilities of the object's possible position are given. A search (theory) problem is characterized by three pieces of data [7] : (i) the probabilities of the searched object (the "target") being in various possible locations; (ii) the local detection probability that a particular amount of local search effort could detect the target; (iii) the total amount of searching effort available. The problem is to find the optimal distribution of this total effort that maximizes the probability of detection [7] .
The growth of the search theory literature has been chronicled in [3] . For instance, the last item (search games) is the primary focus of recent researches, including numerous sub-domains such as : mobile evaders, avoiding target, ambush games, inspection games and tactical games. For moving target problems, decisive progress have been made in developing search strategies that maximize the probability of detecting the (moving) target within a fixed amount of time. However, although the general formalism of search theory will be used subsequently, we shall study radically different problems.
The area of search theory can be divided broadly in two parts, one-sided search and two-sided [2] ,[ 13. Even if Markovianity is a common assumption for modelling target motion, it is not so realistic for many situations. To a large extend, this is adapted to our ignorance about the target behavior. However, for many situations, we can have a more precise description of the target possibilities [2] , [ 11. Thus, in this paper, we deal with a two-sided search games played by a searcher and a mobile target with a rather simple type of motion called the conditionally deterministic motion (CDM). Here, the target motion takes place on a network and, more precisely, on a set of possible paths.
After a general introduction of two-person zero-sum games, we examine various formulations of a search game for a target moving across a network [ 5 ] , [4] . Then, this approach is extended to interdiction games [8] and multiple detections [5] .
Search Games

Two-Person Zero Sum Games
Games are the natural framework for avoiding the need of a strong prior about the target location; i.e. both target and searcher have (randomized) strategies. In this setting, we denote aij the cost for player I to choose row i while player 2 chooses column j . A two-person zero-sum game (denoted tpzg for the sequel) is a matrix game. If in a matrix game A = (aij) ,i = l...m , j = l...n, there exists a couple ( i * , j * ) s.t. V i and Vj, we have aij. 5 apj. 5 a p j , then the couple ( i * , j * ) is a saddle point for a pure strategy and we have: maxminaij = minmaxaij = ai.j*. A mixed strategy for the player 1 is a m-uple denoted x = (x1,x2, ..., xm) where the {Zj} are positive and sum to 1. A mixed strategy for the player 2 is a n-uple denoted 9 = ( y i ,~~, ..., Yn) with vj 2 0 V j and Cj y j = 1. The meaning of the x vector is: player 1 chooses the pure strategy i with the probability xi. Similarly, the player 2 chooses the pure strategy j with the probability yj; total cost being xiyjaij = xTAy. It has been proven (Von Neuman) that all the matrix games have a saddle point for mixed strategies; i.e. there always exists vectors x and y such that:
where v is called the game value. Equivalently, a solution {x*, y*} is characterized by:
The first condition sets that x* assures at least 21 whatever the pure straregy of player 2 is; idem for the second one. Every matrix game can be described (and solved) by the following linear optimization problem (player 1, primal problem) : 2.2 A search game for a target moving across a network
Simple constraints
Here, we are dealing with the detection of a target whose motion is constrained to be a path in a network.
The space of possible target positions is made of cells indexed by j ; j = 1,2, ..., m. Time is also discretized in n periods. A target path w = { j ( t ) , t = 1,2, ..., n } is defined as a sequence of cell indexes. Thus, j ( t ) is the cell occupied by the target at period t. The set of possible paths is known from the searcher. The target can choose any feasible path in the network. On another hand, the search effort is bounded above at each period. So, the aim of the searcher is to maximize the probability of detecting the target within the search constraints; while for the target it is to minimize the probability to be detected [6] .
The number K of possible paths is assumed to be finite. Let Tt (U) the cell where the target is at period t and the path w having been selected by the target. Furthermore, if the target remains undetected at time n, it is the winner of the game. Here, the total search effort {C(t) t = 1,2, ..., n } is indefinetely divisible. The search effort allocated to cell j at time t is denoted cp(j, t). If the target is in the cell j at time t , the conditional probability of detection is given by'
where a ( j ) is the visibility coefficient. The search policy @ is defined by the spatio-temporal search efforts, i.e. The function g(w, 9) is strictly convex w.r.t. the com-
= {cp(j, t ) } . t . The parameters {C(t)}, { a ( j ) }
Another fundamental point is that the search efforts cp(Tt(w),t) act separately. Therefore, the optimal search strategy is unique and it is a pure strategy. Now, we define the mixed target strategy by P = {p, : w E Q } , so that we have to consider the functional G(P, a) defined as :
and the optimization problem we have to deal with is :
under the constraints :
I .
(7)
'This density is arbitrary but motivated by operational considerations. Funhermore, it can be replaced by any concave or pseudo-concave functional
Let P* = {p:} and (resp.) ** = {cp*(j,t)} be the optimal strategies of the target and (resp.) the searcher essary conditions are straightforwardly deduced from the and denote , UO = maxg(w, @*). Then the following nec-
where O ( j , t ) = {w T t ( w ) = j } and At is a Lagrange multiplier and while the game value is G = PO. We remark that PO can be also characterized by : 
t. [z; ( y~( j , t ) }~,~] ,
by means of the Simplex algorithm. The target strategy can be obtained as the solution of a linear system derived from 8 and 9. Examples will be provided later.
Some examples
Here a simple game with 3 cells (m=3), 3 periods (n=3) and 4 paths (K=4) is considered. Paths are defined by :
The constraints on the temporal amounts of search effort are :
, C ( l ) = 0.9, C(2) = 0.3, C(3) = 0.6 while a ( j ) = 1 V j . 
Generalized constraints
In the previous problem, the amount of search effort at period t is bounded above by C(t). However, three types of constraints denoted Ci have a natural interpretation in this context, namely:
Note that this problem has a specific meaning only if = (1,1, l), U2 = (1,2,2), w 3 = (2,2,1 
An interdiction game
Again, a target is moving on a network but this time the search effort is not indefinitely divisible. At each period the target is transiting from a node s and to an adjacent node t. Simultaneously, the searcher selects one arc k in the network and inspects this arc. If the target is passing throughout the arc k, then it is detected with a probability pk. These detection probabilities are known both from the target and the searcher. The aim of the searcher is to find the inspection strategy which maximizes the probability that the target be detected. Opposite, the target strategy is to minimize it. Therefore, this problem can be viewed as a tpzg[?].
We consider here the following game [8].
Let us now present a general formulation for this prob- Our aim is to solve a tpzg Q where the pure strategy of the searcher is to select a path I , from s to t. Let us define the z vector by : z k = 1 if the searcher inspects the arc k and z k = 0 else. Then, the cost function V for Q is defined by : V ( z , l ) = p k z k , which is the probability that the target be detected. The V ( z , Z) expectation is denoted $J and is the interdiction probability. For the searcher, the objective is to maximize $, while it is the converse for the target.
k E A ( 1 )
Let x k be the probability that the searcher inspects the k arc and denote y1 the probability that the target chooses the path 1. Thus, the vectors x and (resp.) y represent the mixed strategies of the searcher, (resp.) target; and :
LEA IEL
The optimization problem can be written as the matrix game 
{ i=l
Not surprisingly, the problem may be solved by a Simplexlike algorithm. However, a major problem may be the cardinality of the set of paths which can grows very rapidly. 
Results
The network as well as the possible paths are described below : 
Optimal search for gain maximization
In the previous problems, we were considering both target and searcher strategies in a game perspective. This is no longer the case, even if the general context is still the search of a target moving in a network. Here, the aim of the searcher is to detect as frequently as possible the target. Thus, the objective functional is no longer binary. The interest of this approach is that it is closer to the objective of target tracking. Let us present now the modelling [5] .
Let G(V,A) be this network with V the set of nodes and A the set of arcs (n = #A). The target has available a set R of possible paths and selects one of them for all the search duration. The path 1 E R is made of ml arcs denoted Z (1), 1(2) , ..., Z(m1). The probability that the target selects the path I for transiting across the network is equal to 7T(Z) 2 0 ( E T(Z) = 1).
1ER
A search plan is made of elementary efforts (Pk 2 0 distributed on the arcs and denoted q5 = {VI, ...,pn}. Conditionnally to the search effort (Pk (on the arc k) and to the event "target is passing throughout this arc", it is detected with a probability p k = 1 -eXp(-CX.k(Pk) ( a k >_ 0). If the target is detected on the arc k, the searcher has an income of v k 2 0, at an expense equal to c k 2 0. The objective functional is the gain of the search, i.e. incomes minus expenses. For instance, we can assume that the probability P(1, i) that the target be detected on one the arcs Z(l), Z(2), ..., Z(i) conditionally to the event "target is passing throughout the path E R '' is *:
Thus, the probability to detect on the arc Z(i) is P(1,i) -P(1, i -l), with P(1,O) = 0; with an income equal to &(i). Then, the objective functional is the gain R(4) defined by : Here, we restrict to WO cells and the evader begins at cell 1. Theevadermustchooseaperioda E (1, ...,T-l} forgoing from cell 1 to cell 2 and then another period T{O. + 1, ..., T } for going from cell 2 to the evader-target. Let zt the search effort allocated to cell 1, the rest being allocated to cell 2. Assume, furthermore, that the elementary non-detection probability is exponential; then the non-detection probability for period t ( Pnd(t)) is obtained by considering the following events (see [9] for all the definitions):
1. evader remains in cell 1, throughout the whole scenario1 2. evader is in cell 1 and moves to cell 2, (t = c), -) P n d = 3. evader remains in cell 2 (a < t < 7). -+ Pnd = (1 5 t < 0). P n d = p;t aft 4. evader in cell 2 and moves to the target (U < t < T ) , +
We also assume that (ai < pi 5 1) and we have to consider a tpzg where the evader strategy (player 1) is defined by the two transition numbers U and T , while the searcher strategy is defined by the T -uple z = ( 1 1 , , ZT}. The objective functional stands as follows:
Pnd =a;-"* .
T The mixed evader strategy amounts to considering the probability to select the couple {U, T } , while for the searcher it is to choose s with a probability we. The searcher strategy w, is obtained by solving the following linear programm:
{ we remark that the searcher has a clear "tendency" to choose s on thefirst steps.
Proposition 2.
The optimal searcher strategy [9] is given by solving the following linear system: Z l 1 W S = l .
Results Consider the following values for the non-detection functions: p1 = 0.9,al = 0 . 6 ,~~ = 0.5, then we have for t = 10 (game value 0.4214):
I 9 I 0.0005 I
Conclusions
Various formulations of search games for detecting a target transiting across a network have been considered. All of them share a general framework based on tpzg and linear programming.
It is worth to mention that linear programming permits to'consider a large number of paths. However, to take benefit from this great tool, the objective functional must be separable which may be questionable.
A AppendixA
More generally, we consider the functional G(P, @) defined by:
where the functional f stands for the non-detection probability.
We have to deal with the following problem; find P' (target) and 9' such that : G(P, 9 ' ) 5 G(P*, 9 ' ) 5 G(P', 9) tlp, V 9 .
(27)
So, we have to examine two problems.
A.l First sub-problem
G(P, 9 * ) 5 G(P', a*).
We have to find the necessary conditions for the following problem : m $ -G(P,@*) ,
p w = 1 , pw > o v w E 0.
W € R
The associated Lagrangean (uw 2 0 Vw E Q) is :
So that we have two cases to consider: a)-First subcase: p: > 0 ;
